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N i c o l a M o f f a t
Rape and the (Animal) Other: Making Monsters
in J. M. Coetzee’s Disgrace
A long with postcolonial studies, ethnicity studies, and queer theory,feminist scholarship has noted that inquiries made within Western on-tology have largely been made by white, (predominantly) heterosexual
men, speaking from positions of privilege and/or power. As such, deﬁni-
tions of being have their roots in white, cis-male, heteronormative privilege,
excluding anyone who does not ﬁt these boundaries. Furthermore, Western
history concerning being, since at least Plato, has insisted on splitting mind
and body, favoring the mind as formative of subjective experience and den-
igrating the body as impure and unworthy of philosophical inquiry. As this
article demonstrates, the mind/body binary is in fact symptomatic of the
masculine ontological imperative to disown the body and its effects on be-
ing, which is particularly important regarding the performative effects of
rape. However, the body has haunted ontological analyses, from somatic
symptoms in psychoanalysis to the scandal of the speaking body in linguis-
tics, and feminist scholarship has called for a revision of the body’s ontolog-
ical signiﬁcance, which was ﬁrst rejected by feminist writers for its essentialist
connotations. The outright rejection of the body’s role in being, however, is
akin to rejecting a critical reading of half of any binary category, as it reiﬁes the
idea that binary constructs are opposites. In recent years, and mostly by way
of feminist and queer theory, bodily practices have become an integral part
of ontological inquiries, and this article emerges from theories pertaining to
the body—the female body in particular. In its separation of mind and body,
the canon has “lost” what it means to be a body, disparaged the body as in-
ferior to the mind, and has made the body symbolic of a further denigrated
femininity. Luce Irigaray, for example, points out that psychoanalytic dis-
course “gets rid” of the body by ascribing it to the feminine, suggesting that
both the body and the feminine are things to be rid of (1985, 90).
This article intends to break away from this formation of the feminine, in
part by building on the theories of poststructuralist feminist theorists Judith
Butler and Rosi Braidotti, especially on Butler’s understanding of perfor-
mative identity acts and Braidotti’s revision of the Deleuzian concept of
becoming. The conceptual schools of performativity and becoming both
require an understanding of identity practice that is incumbent on the body.
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My investigation was born of a desire to link identity performativity to a the-
ory of monstrosity, one that could explain how ﬁctional qualities adhere to
bodies, making identities recognizable by the outward signs and gestures
monstrous bodies perform. These signs and gestures are often taken as
marks of an “authentic” or “original” self, and as coming from an essential,
internal core, but as Butler shows, these gestures actually constitute iden-
tity, concealing their genesis and presenting the body as the origin of these
acts (1999, 33). Thus, acts that have come to be understood as originating
from inside are instead mimetic of behavior that has been perceived as ap-
propriate for certain bodies; these acts come from outside the body (enacted
by other bodies) and ﬁnd themselves reembodied and reenacted.
Butler’s analysis of the sedimented acts that accumulate to form gender
has brought the body back to scholarship concerning being by pointing out
that the mundane daily gestures of the body are in fact what produce the
“I.” The implication of Butler’s ontology is that one’s identity is not a ﬁxed
category but a structure in ﬂux; its negotiations between bodily perfor-
mances are described as “strategies” for the “I’s” survival in a binary world
(1988, 522). It is for this reason that I employ Braidotti’s theories, which
conceptualize identity as a process of becoming rather than being. The shift
from a static to an active term not only emphasizes the performative quali-
ties of identity formation, in the sense that it is a constitutional “doing,”
but suggests ﬂuidity and multiplicity in its creation. Moreover, “becoming”
is a present participle, signifying a sustained process that comes to accrue
substance as well as an opening for varied, multiplicitous, and even con-
tradictory identity practices. As Butler points out, “gender is a complex-
ity whose totality is permanently deferred, never fully what it is at any given
juncture in time” (1999, 22): that it is not fully what it is implies the ambiv-
alence at the heart of identity. It is through a conceptualization as mul-
tiplicitous, contradictory, ambivalent, and incongruous that some forms
of being have been linked to theories of monstrosity. Certain feminist
and queer theories, as well as postcolonial critiques, have noted the inclina-
tion of authorities to employ the language of monstrosity when writing or
speaking about difference, by which I mean the othering that takes place in
discourse, making the other an uncanny specter that haunts the “I” who
speaks.1 I understand “discourse” to mean precisely what Butler under-
stands by the term in her Foucauldian reading of identity politics, which
1 On feminist theories of the monstrous and the other, see Judith Halberstam’s Skin Shows
(1995). On queer theories of the same, see Partha Mitter’s Much Maligned Monsters (1977),
and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s “Three Women’s Texts and a Critique of Imperialism”
(1985).
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is the combined signifying processes of cultural practices that, repeated over
time, create what they signify. In other words, I understand “discourse” as
being fundamentally performative.
As this article theorizes the making of monsters, it is useful to list the per-
tinent meanings of “monstrosity.” The Oxford English Dictionary cites the
Latin monstrum, meaning “portent” or “prodigy,” as the root of “mon-
ster,”with the verbmonere (to warn) as its base.2 Chris Baldick adds another
verb that makes up the base of monstrum, which is monstrare, “to reveal,”
hence the English “to demonstrate” (1987, 10). Monsters are thus a reve-
lation, serving as a warning to others for transgressive behavior. The etymol-
ogy of “monster” is important, as its category indicates a doing; the monster
signiﬁes not only a “to be” but a “to do” at its very root, making monsters
necessarily performative. The deﬁnition of “monster” has also mutated and
evolved to incorporate other meanings, and thus the signiﬁer demonstrates
a multiplicity of identities that are always already at its core. What this article
proposes is the realization of a feminist ontology based on a positive under-
standing of monstrosity, where I read the end result of othering, the misrep-
resented body of the other, as a potential site for more positive, empowered
identity performances. In other words, I interpret the monstrous “I” as a
potentially positive model for identity practice. By demonstrating the ability
of performative acts to affect bodies, while simultaneously analyzing the af-
fectivity of monstrous ﬁgures, this article proposes a new theoretical category,
which I have named the “monstrative”—a performative force that others the
“I” through physical and discursive acts. If monsters exist as signs, then the
monstrative is the performative force that makes the other into such a sign,
into a monster. The monstrative is related both to the performative and to
othering; while “performative” accounts for creation, it does not always cre-
ate monsters, where monstrative acts do. Moreover, while othering explains
the process by which the “I” is made other by exterior forces, it does not ad-
equately account for the processes that make others other to themselves. I
also do not consider monstrativity and becoming to be opposing forms—
the monstrative is a process perpetrated against the (body of the) other, while
becoming is a process that can only be initiated through mutual consent—
but both are performative processes that result in monstrosity. The mon-
strative also underlines the signiﬁcance of embodiment to identity formation
through its affectivity, explaining how monsters are made, not biologically
but socially and culturally. Moreover, although deconstruction stresses the
gap that occurs between any signiﬁer and its signiﬁed, “monster” is a signiﬁer
2 Oxford English Dictionary Online, s.v. “monster.”
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without a signiﬁed; it is what Jeffrey Jerome Cohen calls a “kind of third
term” or a “third-term supplement” (1996, 6–7). “Monster” is thus a signi-
ﬁer whose signiﬁed is always already yet to come, emphasizing the becoming
that repeatedly takes place within monstrosity.
Butler’s understanding of performativity is that repeated “stylized acts”
performed upon and by the body create gender, and that these acts, in turn,
create the “I” (1999, 34). The discourse surrounding bodies, including the
names we use to categorize them, constitutes them according to that diag-
nosis (Butler 1997). Thus, “monster” is the descriptive category that brings
a ﬁgure into being asmonster. That identity takes shape as a multiplicity and
that this taking shape is a continuous project also echoes the multiple mean-
ings of “monster” and the resistance of the monstrous body to take on sig-
niﬁcation as anything other than an open signiﬁer. Thus, unrecognizable
identity acts are conceived of only as something other, an unknown entity
that resists the symbolic, remaining unnameable and unrepresentable. Using
“becoming” to explain identity as the accretion of substance through perfor-
mative acts always already implies something else yet to come, a project that
is unceasing. Monstrosity is a powerfully generative paradigm against which
to read the processes of becoming at play in human identity practice because
its etymology indicates not only the multiplicity of meanings always already
incorporated by the “I” but that these various meanings constitute the “to
come” inherent in becoming and in all performative acts. Braidotti’s reeval-
uation of Deleuzean becoming revises second-wave feminist theory by char-
acterizing becoming as “becoming-minoritarian” (Braidotti 2002, 96),
which I interpret as becoming-monster: this necessitates multiplicity in
terms of identity structure (race, ethnicity, sexuality, class, religion, age, spe-
cies), where “all becoming is becoming monster; even the desire to want to
become is monstrous, because all becoming is about an ambiguity between,
but never attaining either of, two points” (MacCormack 2004, 11).
Like the monstrative, becoming-monster is a process, but it is not its
equivalent: where monstrativity constitutes the body as a sign of otherness,
becoming-monster is an empathetic response to the other who has been clas-
siﬁed as monstrous through monstrative acts. In other words, the mon-
strative results in a body being made sign, where becoming is to be necessar-
ily between forms, to escape signiﬁcation. Monstrative acts are thus done to
the body of the other, where becoming is a process adopted by the “I.” As I
demonstrate shortly inmy analysis of J.M. Coetzee’s novelDisgrace (2000),
the monstrative produces a body of difference that the sovereign “I” charac-
terizes as monstrous, by which I mean abhorrent, abject, ﬁlthy, feared, and
excluded. Becoming, on the other hand, results in amonster, but this monster
is a hybrid category. Many classical monsters are hybrids and are monstrous
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only because of their resistance to categorization. Women can be classed as
this form of monster because of our ability to reproduce and thus become,
in a fundamentally bodily sense, a hybridized form. Moreover, the monstra-
tive is a violent and negative force, while becoming allows for a much more
positive view of otherness. I use Coetzee’s Disgrace as a case study of mon-
strative acts and becoming-monster, especially concerning the monstrativity
of discursive acts in literary narrative and of violent bodily acts such as rape.
The particular narrative form that Coetzee employs in Disgrace discursively
shapes the identities represented according to a speciﬁc ideological view,
which is that of David Lurie, the novel’s protagonist. What becomes clear
in the process of this analysis is that what is meant by “discourse” includes
violent bodily acts, which come to supplement ideological imperatives and
which violently (re)order bodies according to these ideologies. Thus, in the
process of demonstrating the monstrativity of certain bodily acts, I also dem-
onstrate that these acts supplement discourse.
I deal with two major theoretical concerns as they relate to the category of
the monstrative: the constitutionality of rape and the process of becoming-
animal. These themes both relate to identity formation, speciﬁcally regarding
the production of an “I” always in relation (and often in opposition) to a
“you”; this invariably produces an ethics concerning human relationships,
as well as our relationships with other beings. Thus, ontological queries al-
ways already presuppose the “I’s” responsibilities toward the other; as Butler
writes, “I begin my story of myself only in the face of a ‘you’ who asks me to
give an account” (2005, 11). Accounting for oneself, in this frame, has the
double meaning of self-constitution before the other and defending one’s ac-
tions. Disgrace can certainly be understood as the attempt by its white, male
protagonist to account for his actions, yet, as it is written in the third person
and focalized through its protagonist, the narrative allows one a degree of dis-
tance from the accountability of ﬁrst-person confessional narratives such as
Vladimir Nabokov’s Lolita. Instead, Disgrace posits a narrative where the
constitutional effects of rape indirectly affect protagonist David Lurie (who
is himself accountable for rape), which is played out by his becoming-animal
as the novel progresses.
Disgrace is a novel written in two parts. The ﬁrst section, to which the
novel’s title refers, deals with Professor Lurie’s fall from grace after his stu-
dent, Melanie Isaacs, makes a formal complaint regarding his misuse of her.
Having embarked on a mission to seduce his student, Lurie (who, inciden-
tally, realizes that his behavior is bad) is unable to make the connection be-
tween his misuse of her and the later event in which he and his daughter,
Lucy, are attacked at her farm in Grahamstown. The second half of the
novel focuses on the aftermath of this incident, which sees Lurie’s eventual
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ability to atone for his violation of Melanie through a profound sense of
empathy with the other, initiated by his becoming-animal. At the fore of
Coetzee’s philosophy inDisgrace is a deeply ethical concern for the individ-
ual’s responsibilities toward the other, which in the novel takes the form of
the animal—the silent, impenetrable, absolute other that has been subject
to centuries of human violence and neglect. Thus, the ethical questions with
which Coetzee is engaged emphasize moments of human silence and refusal
that are juxtaposed against the absolute other’s inability to communicate.
The other’s silence, whether a conscious choice or not, is also contrasted
with the human propensity to use narrative as a form of justiﬁcation, which
highlights the constitutional effects of narrative and literary discourse. In
Disgrace, the literary canon is very clearly demonstrated as monstrative, as
well as being presented as a system of representation that can be and has
been wielded by a self-serving androcentric authority.
The conceptual deﬁnition of “rape” is a crucial aspect of the novel, but it
is also key to this article, as it exempliﬁes what is at stake in the use of
monstrative language, demonstrating how those with the authority to wield
language use it to corroborate their innocence, vilify the victims of sexual
violence, and perpetuate their power and the cycle of oppression. In another
article (Moffat 2013), I discuss the interrelation of the performativity of
rape and the performativity of its deﬁnition: here, this serves as a point from
which to discuss the monstrativity of (speciﬁcally) rape and (generally) vio-
lent bodily and speech acts. I then turn to a discussion of responsibility to
the other as it ﬁgures in Disgrace and how it relates to violent acts that
not only cause injury but constitute identities through the act of injury. I
also demonstrate the critical importance of Lucy’s sexuality to an emerg-
ing black masculine power in the new South Africa, where she is raped be-
cause of what her materially female (lesbian) body signiﬁes. Monstrative acts
are the process whereby bodies are made into signs, and rape is a monstra-
tive force that feminizes its victim’s body, simultaneously masculinizing
the body/ies of the perpetrator/s. Silence plays a crucial role in the repre-
sentation and justiﬁcation of all violent acts, and it is often the reclamation
of the victim’s once-silenced narrative that is used to redeﬁne these acts.
Whether silencing has been enforced or is symptomatic of trauma, its exis-
tence is often taken as consent and used in part as justiﬁcation for bodily vi-
olence.Disgrace goes so far as to use silence as a literary device, where Lucy’s
refusal to narrate her rape becomes one of the major ethical points in her fa-
ther’s redemption arc.
The choice Lucy makes in remaining silent, however limited that may be,
is juxtaposed against the absolute narrative silence of the animals that pop-
ulate the novel, where human silence constitutes a refusal to narrate, to rep-
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resent, or to claim witness to an event. While Lucy’s rape is unrepresented
by the novel, Melanie’s is aestheticized and fetishized to the extent that it is
(more often than not) misdeﬁned by the novel’s critics. We are furthermore
not offered Melanie’s perception of the events, as she is the object of Lurie’s
narrative focus. The performativity of narrative to shape the “truth” of
events is indelibly tied to the manner in which rape is interpreted as rape,
which, in turn, perpetuates the constitution of rape culture. Rape culture
is narrowly deﬁned as a cultural acceptance of rape but is also gradually com-
ing to mean the acceptance of the ownership of women’s bodies within
public spaces, a narrative that is enacted through rape as well as other prac-
tices that perpetuate the (self-)regulation of women’s bodies. The narratives
of ownership and control, the total lack of female and animal voice, and fo-
calization are implemented not only to critique misogynist practices but to
demonstrate the interrelation between phallocentrism and androcentric,
technocratic, planet-harming acts. Much of Coetzee’s writing has been
noted as focusing on the slippage between a European conceptualization
of land ownership and the misuse of women’s bodies, and Disgrace contin-
ues this slippage in the form of Lucy’s rape and her ownership of her farm.3
This is further disrupted by the misuse of animals’ bodies in the novel, both
physically and discursively.
As the novel’s title suggests, its narrative concentrates on the protago-
nist’s fall from grace into a state of abjection; he ﬁnds redemption only when
he accepts the removal of his power, which is characterized as his becoming-
animal. Tom Herron (2005) notes that Lurie literally becomes a “dog-
man” (Coetzee 2000, 64) through a metamorphosis that is always already
incomplete, where he does not become a dog but a hybrid version of him-
self and the dogs that come under his care in the second half of the novel.
This becoming-animal ﬁnds an echo in classical antiquity, in which monsters
often take the form of hybridized animals, including animal-human hybrids,
which exist under the appellation “monster” because they do not obey the
categories nature has ostensibly set out for them. In order to demonstrate
this metamorphic process, I employ Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s
concept of becoming-animal, which they explain, “is to participate in a
movement, to stake out the path of escape in all its positivity, to cross a
threshold . . . to ﬁnd a world of pure intensities where all forms come un-
done, as do all the signiﬁcations, signiﬁers, and signiﬁeds, to the beneﬁt
of an unformed matter of deterritorialized ﬂux, of nonsignifying signs”
(2004, 96). Becoming, then, means existing outside the symbolic order; be-
ing dog-man means that Lurie’s identity is not categorical as either/or but
3 See Barnard (2003), Graham (2003), Segall (2005), and Lopez (2010).
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gives him the potential to escape the violence of signiﬁcation, which in Dis-
grace is represented lexically, through the use of animal and sexual meta-
phors legitimized by the Western canon, and formally, through the repre-
sentation of rape.
Lurie’s becoming-animal occurs through his state of disgrace and the
event in which he is attacked and Lucy raped; this leads to his eventual
atonement—for his wrongdoings against Melanie but also in the sense of
being at one with those who share his abjection. In Disgrace, these are
the dogs that he and Bev Shaw euthanize because nobody else can or wants
to care for them. His “at-one-ment” with these animals is what makes Lurie
a monster, a dog-man, but this becoming-animal does not occur in one sin-
gle event; instead, Lurie’s becoming is a series of events that accrue to make
him at one with the other he has up to this stage treated as secondary and
inferior. It is through this becoming-animal that Coetzee invites us to med-
itate on our relationship with the other as other and to reﬂect on similar
tropes regarding human (mal)treatment of animals, colonialism, and gen-
dered arrangements and expectations. My focus here is on the ethics of per-
formative acts, on our responsibilities to the other that we constitute and to
the monsters that we create. The concept of becoming, particularly in its re-
lation to the static philosophical and psychoanalytical notion of being, nec-
essarily invokes an ethics because it is always already a matter of one’s being
affecting another’s and vice versa. The ethical concerns of this analysis are
not just to question what responsibilities we have to our (linguistic) crea-
tions but to interrogate the right to narrate in the ﬁrst instance. If narrative
creates symbolic meaning and the ordering of the world according to the
narrator’s tenets, what right does s/he have to wield the word, especially
when its use can injure, traumatize, and constitute identity in a state of ab-
jection? What right do we have to demand the other’s story?
Two performative acts take place when rape is committed: the rape itself,
which creates and reiﬁes gender binaries, simultaneously placing categories
within a hierarchical structure, and the rhetoric that supports the act, either
by claiming that it is not rape or through victim blaming, thereby creating
and perpetuating rape culture (Moffat 2013, 101–2). Rape culture also does
much more than just condone physical assault, and while it affects men
adversely, and in varying ways, I will be focusing on its negative effects on
women’s lives. I am especially concerned with deﬁnitions of rape and their
connection to the production of rape culture, particularly with regard to aes-
theticized narrative representations such as those we ﬁnd in literary texts. I
moreover use “narrative” rather than “discourse” to describe these represen-
tations, as “narrative” implies an element of storytelling, an artistic weaving
of events, and a making of representation that “discourse” does not neces-
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sarily express. The deﬁnition of rape is contingent on storytelling, as Lynn A.
Higgins and Brenda R. Silver explain in Rape and Representation, stating
that “who gets to tell the story and whose story counts as ‘truth’ determine
the deﬁnition of what rape is” (1991, 1). As they point out, the person nar-
rating is who gets to deﬁne retrospectively the act as rape or not, where “rep-
resentations of rape after the event are almost always framed by a masculine
perspective premised on men’s fantasies about female sexuality and their
fears of false accusation, as well as their codiﬁed access to and possession
of women’s bodies” (2).
The deﬁnition of rape is a major conceptual conundrum in Disgrace.
Where Lucy’s rape is rape in the classic sense—enforced and violent pene-
trative sex by three total strangers—it is not the only rape that occurs in the
novel. Lurie’s “affair” with his student, Melanie, is complicated by the im-
balance of power between them, which is not just that of student-teacher
but is based on race (Herron [2005, 477] notes the strong possibility that
Melanie is mixed-race, while Lurie is deﬁnitely white), afﬂuence, and espe-
cially gender. Furthermore, as the following scene demonstrates, this power-
dynamic culminates in rape:
“No, not now!” she says, struggling. “My cousin will be back!” But
nothing will stop him. . . . She does not resist. All she does is avert her-
self: avert her lips, avert her eyes. She lets him lay her out on the bed
and undress her: she even helps him, raising her arms and then her
hips. . . . Not rape, not quite that, but undesired nevertheless, unde-
sired to the core. As though she had decided to go slack, die within
herself for the duration, like a rabbit when the jaws of the fox close
on its neck. (Coetzee 2000, 24–25)
This is one of the most problematic moments in the novel, because of
what it depicts, how it is depicted, and who narrates the moment. As
Higgins and Silver write, in deciding if rape is rape, “who is speaking may
be all that matters” (1991, 1). Although this is a third-person narrative,
Lurie is its focalizer, meaning that the narrative goes some way to vindicate
his actions. Focalization gives us insight into his motivations, but it also
makes us aware of the ideology to which Lurie is heir, that is, a white Eu-
ropean patriarchy. By writing in the third person, Coetzee is distanced from
the narrative that would otherwise perhaps conﬂate him with his protago-
nist. Like Lurie, Coetzee is a privileged, educated, white South African
man; thus, his treatment of such contentious subject matter, not only re-
garding race relations but as a male writer writing rape, has to be cautious.
By focalizing this scene through Lurie, Coetzee represents rape from the
point of view of a man who believes he is the “servant of Eros,” whose “case
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rests on the rights of desire” no matter who is affected (Coetzee 2000, 89).4
Moreover, Lurie cannot make the comparison between this scene and later,
when his daughter is raped by three strangers. Both during and after this
scene, however, he is characterized by an apparent lack of autonomy, over-
taken instead by a desire planted in him by ancient (European) gods:
“Strange love! Yet from the quiver of Aphrodite, goddess of the foaming
waves, no doubt about that” (2000, 25). Lurie’s lack of agency is comple-
mented byMelanie’s implied willingness to assist him: she “does not resist,”
she “helps him, raising her arms and then her hips” (2000, 25). As Higgins
and Silver explain, substantiating a rape claim often means that victims have
to prove their “innocence” by exhibiting resistance during the assault and
demonstrating a chaste sex life (1991, 2). Disgrace obfuscates deﬁnition in
its depiction ofMelanie’s compliancewithLurie’s acts, but it does this because
the historic deﬁnition of rape is not clear-cut.Womenmay submit to their rap-
ists for any number of reasons, chief among them the fear of physical injury or
death, but this does not mean that what they have suffered is not rape.
Narratives that employ victim blaming are precisely the kinds of represen-
tation that constitute rape culture. Victim blaming,moreover, is accompanied
by the rapist’s surrender of autonomy: Lurie is not accountable for his actions
because he is a “servant of Eros,” because the god “acted through” him
(Coetzee 2000, 89), and he characterizes himself as a dog whose instinctual
urges cannot be helped (89–90). The representation of rape as unavoidable
not only constitutes rape culture, it disguises the fact that it is rape, even from
those who rape. Lurie uses these excuses to convince himself that his liaison
withMelanie is seduction, but, like all rape culture, it is an attempt to (re)claim
a masculinity he feels is being denied him. His failed seduction of Melanie is a
result of the emasculating effects of aging; he ﬁnds that as he ages, his allure
dwindles and he must invent new ways to assure himself of his manliness be-
cause, up until now, his masculinity has been tied to his self-image as a seducer
ofwomen.When his powers of seduction fadewith his looks, he “exist[s] in an
anxious ﬂurry of promiscuity” (2000, 7), and he ﬁnds himself in a position he
regards as abject and sexually undesirable.
Lurie’s emasculation hinges on the sexual conquest of women, so when
he takes the new secretary of his department home for sex, he describes it as
a “failure” because of her enjoyment in the act (2000, 9). Thus, his pursuit
of Melanie is colored by his self-image as a conquistador rather than as an
attentive lover, and women are regarded as objects to be won and then dis-
carded. But the way his affair withMelanie is narrated only adds to his emas-
culation; although he “wins” her sexually a number of times, he is always left
4 The original text is italicized to denote Lurie’s thoughts.
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wanting more from her, as his seduction techniques, while resulting in sex,
do not wholly captivate her. Lurie’s description of his encounters with
Melanie also demonstrate that his emasculation is indelibly tied to his
strange new moribundity, where his seductive techniques fail due to the al-
most visible age gap between them. When he ﬁrst invites her to his apart-
ment, he shows her a ﬁlm by Norman McLaren, probably the 1968 Pas de
Deux, where his hope is that Melanie will feel as “captivated” by McLaren’s
dancers as he is: “Two dancers on a bare stage move through their steps. Re-
corded by a stroboscopic camera, their images, ghosts of their movements,
fan out behind them like wing beats. It is a ﬁlm he ﬁrst saw a quarter of a cen-
tury ago but is still captivated by: the instant of the present and the past of
that instant, evanescent, caught in the same space. Hewills the girl to be cap-
tivated too. But he senses she is not” (Coetzee, 2000, 15).
This passage is crucial to understanding the existential crisis Lurie ﬁnds
himself in, a crisis in which the “I” “cannot be said to have a signiﬁable ex-
istence prior to the mark of [its] gender” (Butler 1999, 13). Finding himself
“losing” his masculinity through his waning seductive powers, Lurie loses
his self-understanding as a man. Because he lives within a system of binaries,
this can only mean that he is becoming-woman, a becoming that he will
later try to actively perform. The signiﬁcance of this passage is that ﬁrst, the
dancers are described in the same manner in which Lurie has only just de-
scribed himself, where his declining magnetism has left him a “ghost” of
his former self (2000, 7). Moreover, like the dancers in McLaren’s ﬁlm, he
is a ghost because he exists simultaneously as his old self, the young seducer,
as well as this new self that has lost his power to captivate. Like the dancers,
the two Luries are “caught in the same space” of his desire, and the ﬁlm serves
to visualize this moment of becoming. Second, Melanie cannot be captivated
by the scene of evanescence because she has not yet lived it; Lurie recounts
that it was twenty-ﬁve years since he ﬁrst saw the ﬁlm, whereMelanie can only
be about twenty-one. Lurie’s use of the verb “captivate” is also deliberate: its
lexical relationship with the verb “capture” signals his actual motives for in-
viting Melanie into his house; instead, he ﬁnds himself captured both by
his desire and by his aging body.
Moreover, there is a subtle indication in this passage toward the animal
symbolism with which Lurie regards Melanie in subsequent chapters, where
the “wingbeats” of the dancers’movements foreshadow his eventual portrayal
of her as his “poor little bird” (2000, 32), and his “little dove” (34).5 Imag-
ining Melanie as a caged bird is not a far leap for the reader to make. Animal
imagery is used consistently through the novel for a number of reasons, not
5 Ibid.
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least of which is the language of seduction that Lurie borrows from his liter-
ary forebears. As an academic well-versed in English literature, Lurie adopts
the language of the English poets as a means by which to seduce Melanie,
inviting her to submit by saying that “a woman’s beauty does not belong
to her alone. It is part of the bounty she brings into the world. She has a duty
to share it” (2000, 16).6 To ring this “truth” home, he quotes a line from a
Shakespearean sonnet, but this only serves to further alienate her by reinforc-
ing the divides between them. His role asMelanie’s teacher is emphasized in
this moment, which he thinks stresses their age gap, but what he does not
realize is that he also reiﬁes the strangeness of his master tongue, the English
language with which his ancestors have subjugatedmuch of the African con-
tinent. In History of the Voice, Barbadian poet Kamau Brathwaite writes of
the unfamiliarity felt by children in the colonies learning English poetry in
school, explaining that “what English has given us as a model for poetry . . .
is the pentameter” (1984, 9), yet, to a child living in the Caribbean, this meter
sounds odd and unnatural, for the “hurricane does not roar in pentameters”
(10). The subject matter of English poetry is often a world away from the ex-
periences of people in the (ex-)colonies, which is partly why Lurie’s words
serve only to alienate Melanie.
Lurie’s mastery of the English tradition also performatively constitutes
his masculinity, a masculinity speciﬁcally contingent on a European poetics
of seduction that is made up of centuries’ worth of wooing techniques and
into which Coetzee weaves a complex layer of intertextual material. Lucy
Valerie Graham explains that the Western tradition has had “a fraught rela-
tionship” with the representation of rape (2003, 439), where the poetics of
seduction and aesthetic renditions of rape intersect in worrying ways.
Higgins and Silver meanwhile assert that “the politics and aesthetics of rape
are one” (1991, 1), and in Disgrace it would certainly seem that we are in-
tended to make this connection. Pamela Cooper writes that “Lurie’s sense
of sexual right rests on his mastery of the symbolism of desire and otherness
entrenched within the Anglo-European aesthetic tradition,” where “in con-
temporary South Africa, the erotic conventions of Western art split off from
their referents to drift among alien signiﬁers” (2005, 25). Like Brathwaite’s
contention that English poetic modes ultimately fail in a colonial setting,
Lurie’s speech act misﬁres; it does not convince Melanie to fall in love with
him. However, like many unhappy performatives, Lurie’s iteration of the
Western aesthetic produces an unintentional performative act by replicating
the conventions of rape culture, intonated through the old masters aes-
thetic. Thus, saying that “beauty does not own itself” (2000, 16), while
6 Lurie is professor of communications, but his specialization is English Romantic poetry.
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lofty sounding, ultimately has the performative effect of absolving Lurie of
the crime he later commits, permitting him to become the owner he thinks
Melanie lacks.
Lurie’s allusions to the English tradition, moreover, point to a far deeper,
more insidious Western tradition of representing rape aesthetically. For ex-
ample, Graham points out that the two women raped in Disgrace have
names that echo literary forebears: Lucrece (Lucy) in Shakespeare and Phil-
omela (Melanie) in Ovid (2003, 439). Coetzee’s intersection of Western
aesthetic traditions with the (post)colonial conﬂation of bodies and land
also echoes Western poetic modes of seduction as well as the tradition of
the English pastoral. Much postcolonial feminist theory (e.g., Stoler 1997)
is concerned with the conceptual slippage between imperial expansion and
the bodily violations of those being subjugated by its rule, in both imperi-
alist rhetoric and in the acts carried out in its name, while Coetzee’s writing
often focuses on white South Africans’ relationship with the land.7 How-
ever, in Disgrace, Coetzee conﬂates notions of land ownership and bound-
aries with women’s rights to bodily sovereignty, comparing the patriarchal
modes of the white settlers clinging to their European heritage with those of
the rising black power in the new South Africa. As Rita Barnard (2003)
notes, novels such as Disgrace challenge the “South African Pastoral,” a
genre of white (often Afrikaans) writing that praises the beauty of the land
and the simplicity of pastoral life while omitting the violence that colonial-
ism ensured. Graham further explains that the South African pastoral “pre-
sents a vision of the ‘husband-farmer’ as custodian of the feminine earth,
[which] has been discursively implicated in the colonial appropriation of ter-
ritory” (2003, 438) and whose “dream topography [is] the family farm,
ruled by the patriarch and inscribed (albeit by the invisible labor of black
hands) as a legacy for his sons, theirs to inherit and bequeath in perpetuity”
(Barnard 2003, 204). The South African farm has become a symbol of co-
lonial oppression and thus a contested space for patriarchal control, as have
women’s bodies. The correlation between the rhetoric of colonial land-
grabbing and that of seduction in the European aesthetic tradition is made
precisely because imperialism is patriarchal, and its literature of seduction
quite often belies the misogynist and imperialist ideals of its writers, who
monstratively make metaphorical connections between the conquering of
women’s bodies and the conquering of land.
Lurie is not a conquistador of space, but he is a conqueror of women:
Coetzee instead makes the connection between the patriarchal control of
7 See Coetzee’s In the Heart of the Country (1977) and Life and Times of Michael K.
(1983).
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women’s bodies and colonization through Lucy’s rape, which takes a very
different form from Melanie’s. Signiﬁcantly, in the context of the novel,
Lucy, who is white, is raped by three black men, a detail for which Coetzee
received a lot of criticism following the publication of Disgrace, where pol-
iticians, academics, and journalists all weighed in with their displeasure at
what was deemed a racist attack on postapartheid racial integration (Moffett
2006, 135). Graham, for example, quotes Jeff Radebe, minister for public
enterprises at the time: “In this novel J. M. Coetzee represents as brutally
as he can the white people’s perception of the post-apartheid black man”
(2003, 435). What is made quite clear here is that only Lucy’s ordeal has
been regarded as rape, whereas Melanie’s has not. Many of the novel’s crit-
ics do not even viewMelanie’s ordeal as rape: both Herron (2005, 477) and
Maria Lopez (2010, 924) refer to Melanie’s rape as “abuse,” while Cooper
names it only “effectively a rape” (2005, 25). Sue Kossew, meanwhile,
perplexingly contends that Lurie’s behavior is “more morally complex than
rape, than pedophilia” (2003, 159). The point is that rape and pedophilia
(which I will unfortunately not have space to give proper consideration
here) are not clear-cut events but are subject to a great deal of what Higgins
and Silver call “undecidability” between postincident narratives (1991, 2–3),
due in part to the prevalence of cultural modes that dictate the deﬁnition of
incidents according to patriarchal modes. InDisgrace, neither incident is nar-
rated by the victim but is instead framed by the protagonist who is in one case
the perpetrator and in the other a failed defender: we never hear Melanie’s
version of events, and, because Lucy adamantly refuses to give her account,
neither do we get a clear picture of her rape. Higgins and Silver explain that
in narrative representations of rape the actual event is often absent from the
telling, where it instead “exists as an absence or gap that is both product and
source of textual anxiety, contradiction or censorship” (1991, 3). What
Coetzee thus achieves by omitting Lucy’s narrative is a fetishization of the
kind of rape that Melanie is subjected to, to the point that its very deﬁnition
as rape is obscured, which is surely why most of the novel’s critics only vilify
Lucy’s rape and not Melanie’s.
Part of the reason for this is the long history of deﬂecting rape through
representation, “where it has been turned into ametaphor or a symbol or rep-
resented rhetorically as titillation, persuasion, ravishment, seduction, or desire
(poetic, narrative, courtly, military)” (Higgins and Silver 1991, 4). The def-
inition of rape is obscured because it also has everything to do with having the
authority to rape. Higgins and Silver maintain that “rape and rapability are
central to the very construction of gender identity” (1991, 3), which means
that whether or not the body of the victim is female, the act of rape mon-
stratively constitutes that body as feminine, simultaneously (re)producing
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the masculinity of the person who rapes. With the move from apartheid to
the “new” South Africa, what has clearly been demonstrated by the bewil-
dering number of reported rapes is that this move has precipitated the rise of
a black patriarchy establishing its masculine authority through rape. This is
especially the case with instances of rape that are coupled with further vio-
lence, as with Lucy’s case in Disgrace. The controversy associated with
Lucy’s rape was partly fueled by the sensationalism surrounding many of
these cases, especially as many of them were perpetrated by black men
against white women. However, these cases hardly give an accurate repre-
sentation of the realities of rape for most women in South Africa because
these are sensationalized crimes and not the (no less horriﬁc) everyday inci-
dents of partner rape or coercion.
The upshot of regarding rape as a seduction, popularized in English lit-
erature through metaphors of colonial expansion, hunting, and other mas-
culine pursuits, is the extreme dichotomization of masculine and feminine
sexuality, where being male has become synonymous with being a rapist in-
asmuch as being female has become synonymous with being a disenfran-
chised and passive victim.8 Furthermore, Lucy’s rape is quite clearly an ex-
ercise of masculine authority used as punishment for claiming a masculinity
of her own, which is manifested in two ways: ﬁrst, as a lesbian, she performs
a masculine sexuality through her “ownership” of women and second, by
owning land, Lucy claims an authority denied her by her material body.
Lucy’s rape signiﬁes what both Graham and Cooper refer to as a move from
one patriarchal group to another, where Lucy’s sexuality and status as land-
owner mean that she performs a masculinity that is forbidden her corporeality
by the emerging power. This power is symbolized both positively, through
the ﬁnancial success of Petrus, Lucy’s neighbor and one-time employee, and
negatively, through Lucy’s rape, where “the assault signiﬁes, on a broad
symbolic level, the black phallus replacing the defunct white one as the fea-
tures of patriarchal authority are reconﬁgured in South Africa” (Cooper
2005, 29). As Graham contends, there is more than a suggestion that
Lucy’s lesbianism is partly what provoked her rape (2003, 439), where, as
a lesbian, Lucy performs a masculinity that her black neighbors regard as in-
appropriate. To illustrate this more fully, it is crucial to note that rape rates
continue to rise in South Africa, and, among these rapes, a large portion are
committed with the intent to (re)feminize an unapproved lesbian popula-
tion. Like the sensationalized rapes committed against white women that
make the news, the rapes of South Africa’s lesbians are often coupled with
8 Many love poems from the English tradition use hunting as a symbol of the poet’s desire
for sexual union.
S I G N S Winter 2018 y 415
This content downloaded from 143.239.102.117 on August 20, 2018 07:00:47 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
extreme violence and in some cases murder. In an article covering the “cor-
rective” rapes of lesbians in South Africa, Pumza Fihlani notes that many of
these rapes are committed against “butch” lesbians considered to be “steal-
ing” women from men. Interviewing men on the streets of Johannesburg
for their opinions on the topic, this BBC reporter found that what many said
corroborated the performative effects of rape, with one saying, “when some-
one is a lesbian, it’s like saying to us men that we are not good enough” (in
Fihlani 2011). The pervading logic here is that women are property to be
used by men as they see ﬁt.
As a woman, Lucy is regarded under the new patriarchal order as prop-
erty, meaning that she has no right to property ownership herself, whether
of land, such as her farm, or of “goods,” which she claims by taking other
women into her bed. Graham writes that “as a lesbian, Lucy would be re-
garded as ‘unowned’ and therefore ‘huntable’” (2003, 439), as little more
than an animal, which is speciﬁcally the connection Coetzee wishes us to
make. By owning land, Lucy confounds the private and the public spheres:
because she is a woman, she can neither be the Afrikaner “husband-farmer”
nor a postapartheid custodian of the land such as Petrus. For ﬂouting this
“rule,” Lucy is raped, which, as Cooper writes, is an act that performatively
puts her “in her place,” that is, “the conventional place of wife andmother—
albeit in a reshaped system” (2005, 31; emphasis added).What is more, with
the rape taking place within the domestic sphere, the idea is driven home
most literally (Cooper 2005, 31). When she eventually accepts Petrus’s offer
of marriage, Lucy’s feminization within the new patriarchal order is com-
plete, which, she points out, hinges on his ownership not only of her but
of her land: “Petrus is not offering me a church wedding followed by a hon-
eymoon on theWild Coast. He is offering an alliance, a deal. I contribute the
land, in return for which I am allowed to creep in under his wing. Otherwise,
he wants to remind me, I am without protection, I am fair game” (Coetzee
2000, 203).
That Graham relates Lucy’s lesbianism to being “unowned” and “hunt-
able” under the new patriarchy also links to Coetzee’s treatment of animals
in the novel. Animals, particularly in their use as symbols or metaphors, have
a long history in the Western aesthetic tradition, one that is both reiterated
and deconstructed in Disgrace. Throughout human history, animals have
been subject to and subjected by discursive and bodily subjugation, without
possible recourse, as the animal’s gaze, unlike ours, is not paired with discur-
sive parameters that constitute what it sees. “It is no accident,” writes David
Wood, “that . . . categorical distinctions are actually wielded by only one of
each pair [of binary opposites]” (2004, 133). When Butler writes that the
injurious address “may also produce an unexpected and enabling response”
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by “inaugurating a subject in speech who comes to use language to counter
the offensive call” (1997, 2), the only other who cannot “counter” this call is
the animal. Silence is the point inDisgrace where the animal and the human
converge, where silence has everything to do with abjection and bodily
trauma, and speech and the command to account for oneself are likened
to violent physical penetration. Wood points out that “what is true of nam-
ing . . . is equally true of silence (and speaking out). Silence can preserve
possibilities that articulation would prematurely close off, but, in many po-
litical contexts, silence is construed with consent, and can be fatal” (2004,
135). Lurie cannot understand Lucy’s choice to remain on the farm postrape
because he views her silence on the matter as consent to her violation. This
view, however, is problematic when one considers the silence of animals
and other others who cannot speak. Animals have very little chance of de-
nying the “violence and genocide” (Wood 2004, 129) we continue to put
them through, which take the forms of both bodily trauma and linguistic
categorization, subjecting animals to a master/slave dialectic that, being
speechless, they cannot answer for. Linguistic categorization has also lent it-
self to symbolic associations between animals and human traits, so that ani-
mals have come to represent certain human behavior, becoming metonymic
supplements for our virtues and vices. Thus, dogs have come to be associated
with loyalty and foxes with cunning, even if animal behavior bears nothing
in common with what it represents. Our propensity to view animals symbol-
ically has also often led to their destruction, such as in the case of foxes,
whose presumed “cunning” is part of the rhetoric used in their culling.
Lurie’s mastery of the Western aesthetic tradition means that animal
metaphors have made their way into his vocabulary, especially when speak-
ing of women, which often corresponds with the aesthetic of the hunt, a po-
etic device and common canonical feature used to suggest seduction. Every
woman Lurie encounters in the text is compared to an animal or to animals,
especially where sexuality is concerned. For instance, he quickly loses inter-
est in the new secretary in his department after becoming disgusted by her
sexual enjoyment, which is illustrated using animalistic imagery: “bucking
and clawing, she works herself into a froth of excitement that in the end only
repels him” (2000, 9). Her sexual mannerisms are comparable to two ani-
mals, one that traditionally alludes to masculine sexuality, the horse, and the
other to aberrant female sexuality, a predatory animal with claws, probably
feline. What is more, the horse imagery conveyed by the secretary’s “buck-
ing” and her “froth of excitement” also alludes to an unchecked, bestial sex-
uality that is symbolized by the horse/human hybrid, the centaur, which
represents a monstrously bestial and rapacious form of male sexuality. That
the secretary’s mannerisms allude to a typically masculine sexuality is no
S I G N S Winter 2018 y 417
This content downloaded from 143.239.102.117 on August 20, 2018 07:00:47 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
mistake: because she is not timid about her sexual enjoyment, Lurie ﬁnds
her repulsive. Moreover, pairing this symbolism with feline imagery also
suggests her masculinity, as predation alludes to hunt imagery, which has
traditionally cast men in the role of predator or hunter and women as prey.
Lurie certainly deems himself hunter, describing himself at various stages as
a “fox” (2000, 25), a “worm” (37), a “viper” (38), and a “shark among the
helpless little ﬁshies” (53). That he is able to do so is through his mons-
trative constitution of women as animals, usually of the “helpless” variety,
enabling Lurie to consider himself a hunter or predator, because he views
the world according to a binary logic in which he is a “fox” only because
Melanie is a “rabbit” (25). Lurie casts Melanie as prey not only for the pur-
pose of reifying his masculinity but to vindicate his misuse of her. While his
mastery of the Western tradition normalizes this rhetoric, Lurie also reiter-
ates the human propensity to regard animals as objects. Thus, by likening
Melanie to an animal, he unconsciously recreates her objectiﬁcation.
Coetzee makes a lexical connection between Melanie’s objectiﬁcation
and the objectiﬁcation of animals through the use of repetition. When he
ﬁrst “invites” Melanie to embark on an affair with him, Lurie reasons that
“a woman’s beauty does not belong to her alone. It is part of the bounty
she brings into the world. She has a duty to share it,” thinking to himself,
“she does not own herself. Beauty does not own itself” (2000, 16). Lurie
later uses the same rationale to console himself over the impending slaugh-
ter of Petrus’s two sheep, thinking, “sheep do not own themselves, do not
own their lives” (2000, 123). The purpose of this repetition is not only to
demonstrate the Western patriarchal objectiﬁcation of women through
their similarity to animals but to emphasize the implicit human approval of
livestock slaughter. Coetzee wants us to compare these animals to Melanie,
as a symbol of human kind: if Melanie “does not own” herself, Lurie later
considers, “perhaps he does not own himself either” (2000, 18).
Lurie’s rumination on his lack of self-ownership is also an attempt at self-
justiﬁcation, where, as Kossew argues, confession both enacts vindication
(2003, 158) and performs the act of atonement (156). As its title suggests,
the novel is about being in a state of disgrace for which the protagonist must
atone, which takes place through what Kossew describes as “attending to
the everyday, to the respective needs of an unborn child [Lucy’s] and des-
perate dogs” (2003, 161). While this is perhaps the method by which Lurie
ﬁnds atonement, his amends only properly take place when he ﬁnds himself
in a state of becoming-animal. If the ﬁrst section of the novel demonstrates
Lurie’s fall from grace, the second ﬁnds him learning how to welcome the
absolute other through his atonement (at-one-ment) with the animals in his
care. In the novel’s ﬁrst section, Coetzee uses Lurie as a focalizer in order
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to demonstrate how the protagonist distances himself intellectually both
from his own base desires and the acts of those he feels are beneath him,
thereby monstratively making parts of himself and others into signs of abject
otherness. The very act of metaphoric association is monstrative because it
relates humans to animals according to a human viewpoint. Thus, Lurie re-
gards his aging self as a cockroach (Coetzee 2000, 8) because “cockroach”
is a signiﬁer for something abject, revolting, and other, something to be
shuddered at.
Furthermore, while there are common associations between animal met-
aphors and their meaning, these are only common insofar as their ancestry,
which is to say that we only regard cockroaches as abject and ﬁlthy because
our regard is iterable: our use of animal metaphor hinges on a performative
history of associating animals with human vice and virtue. This is partly be-
cause of the existence of medieval bestiaries, which documented animals
(real and fantastical) according to real or perceived behavior, for which
the animal became metonymic of similar behavior in humans. This is in part
why we still make metaphorical connections between human characteristics
and animals, even if these metaphors have been scientiﬁcally disproven,
such as the notion of being as blind as a bat. What is more, animal meta-
phors became so culturally ingrained in theWest that they ceased to be met-
aphors and became fact, a practice that has had an interesting effect (to say
the least) on psychoanalytic discourses. Braidotti explains that in psycho-
analysis, “each animal signiﬁes a repressed or disavowed aspect of the pa-
tient’s remembered experience, now festering silently into pathology,”where
animals are “metonymic displacements of unprocessed traumas” (2002,
140). However, she also demonstrates that these representations are based
on the psychoanalyst’s understanding of what each animal represents, which
in turn hinges on centuries of repeated metaphorical association.
It is precisely such a reliance on metaphorical meaning that Lurie uses to
other Melanie. Yet after his fall from grace, Lurie is offered salvation
through his becoming-animal, which differs from ﬁnding metaphorical like-
nesses between humans and other animals (Deleuze and Guattari 2004,
87). Lurie does not become the dog-man by imitating the dogs in his care
but rather by being affected by their lot, by suffering with them: “The more
killings he assists in, the more jittery he gets. One Sunday evening, driving
home in Lucy’s kombi, he actually has to stop at the roadside to recover him-
self. Tears ﬂow down his face that he cannot stop; his hands shake. He does
not understand what is happening to him” (Coetzee 2000, 142–43). Lurie
“does not understand what is happening to him” because he is not in the
habit of sympathizing with others and therefore does not recognize the
emotion or its effects. And, because it is not characteristic of Lurie to sym-
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pathize with others, when he tries to reﬂect on Lucy’s rape, he ﬁnds himself
unable to embody her position: “Lucy’s intuition is right after all: he does
understand; he can, if he concentrates, if he loses himself, be there, be the
men, inhabit them, ﬁll them with the ghost of himself. The question is, does
he have it in him to be the woman?” (160). That he can “become” the men
who rape his daughter is easy for Lurie, not least because he is a rapist him-
self (even if he does not know this), but when he tries to embody Lucy, he
can only question his ability to do so. Lurie’s work in the clinic inaugurates
his journey to redemption because being at one with the dogs allows him
to eventually be at one with women as well: empathizing with the dogs
marks this beginning, because empathy is an acknowledgment of the other’s
subjectivity.
Thus can Lurie begin to write his opera, because he begins to see women
as something more than objects, as beings with desires of their own, just as
he was able to commiserate with the dogs’ suffering because he has lived
their disgrace. He ﬁnds the opera almost writing itself, because he can now
embody a woman who had been badly used by a man and on whose longing
and agency the opera will be centered. Finally understanding the complexity
of the other’s being enables Lurie to review the monstrativity of signiﬁcation
that his mastery of the Western aesthetic had both excused and perpetuated.
It is only through really sympathizing with the other, by literally becoming-
other, that Lurie is able to receive redemption for his acts. Moreover, this
sympathy can only be elicited by a love for the absolute other, “the deeper,
more human sense” (Coetzee 2000, 34) of love that he insists Byron’s Lu-
cifer could not be given, the love that he ﬁnds at the root of the English
word for “friend,” “freond, from freon, to love” (102). Redemption hap-
pens because Lurie realizes he must love the absolute other as family, even
if that other is responsible for his and his daughter’s maltreatment. When
Lucy explains on Lurie’s second visit that the “boy” who took part in her
rape, Pollux, is back living with Petrus, she clariﬁes his position by saying,
“Pollux turns out to be a brother of Petrus’s wife’s. Whether that means
a real brother I don’t know. But Petrus has obligations toward him, family
obligations” (200), the very same obligations he will have toward Lucy if
she concedes to marry him.
What Petrus puts into practice by protecting the boy is a model of re-
sponsibility based not on family ties but on a philosophical at-one-ness of
humanity. In certain Southern African traditions, this philosophy is known
as ubuntu, an “anti-Cartesian notion that [states] ‘I am because you are’”
(Wilkinson 2003, 356), or as Desmond Tutu has put it, “[Ubuntu] em-
braces hospitality, caring about others, being willing to go the extra mile
for the sake of others. We believe a person is a person through another per-
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son, that my humanity is caught up, bound up and inextricable in yours.
When I dehumanize you, I inexorably dehumanize myself. The solitary hu-
man being is a contradiction in terms and therefore you seek to work for
the common good because your humanity comes into its own community,
in belonging” (Tutu 1999, 22; emphasis added). However, inasmuch as the
ubuntu model may open the door to a possible utopia, Coetzee’s novel
demonstrates that accepting the other as brother is more easily said than
done.Ubuntu philosophy explicitly states that it is a human bond that has a
bearing on being and does not demonstrate any fellow feeling for the other
beings with whom we share this earth. Given the manner in which women
have been systematically likened to animals, not just aesthetically but through
practices that regard women as usable and ownable, it is no wonder that the
political change in South Africa has resulted only in the exchange of one pa-
triarchy for another. Ubuntu is nevertheless a good place to start, because it
operates by understanding oneself as a part of the other, of all others, and the
other as part of oneself. While ambivalence endures, both at the close of
Coetzee’s novel and regarding our responsibility toward our discursive crea-
tions, the arrival of the monstrous other is inevitable and the question re-
mains: will we persecute it, or will we welcome it as (always already) a part
of our monstrous selves?
School of English
University College, Cork
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